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belt.

COL. SHELFON: Yes, I recognize it but I haven't seen it for two years.

 $MR.\ HOUSTON_1$  Can you tell us in connection with the ejection equipment what the procedure would be -- where the equipment is?

COL. SHELTON: I don't believe this shows the ejection equipment.

This is the destruction but the ejection isn't shown. There was a cable --

MR. HOUSTON: The seat would go back in here.

COL. SHELITON: Yes. This would be the stick; this would be the rudder with the right foot here and the left foot there.

MR. HOUSTON: And what would activate the ejection equipment?

COL. SHELITON: There were two handles on either side and to the best of my knowledge right now the left handle, as you pushed it up, would

lock your shoulder harness. That is the harness that comes with the safety

MR. HOUSTON: How would that harness fasten you to the seat itself?

COL. SHELITON: It goes in behind you and of course with it unlocked you can move forward or backward or you can adjust the straps. It depends on the size of the individual.

MR. HOUSTON: How much leeway do you have when you -COL. SHELTON: You have enough in order to allow you to reach

all of the necessary switches and so forth which was in the cockpit.

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MR. HOUSTON: But when you pulled that ring --

COL. SHELFON: No, sir, this is not a ring. This is a handle.

In other words, before you bail out or anything you pull this up and this locks this and puts you back.

MR. HOUSTON: Then you are pretty well immobilized.

COL. SHELITON: It depends on how tight you have the shoulder

harness.

The right handle pulls up and releases the canopy. Now in this particular aircraft there was a handle here you had to pull up and as you pulled it up this ejected the seat.

GENERAL BULL: Is that in between your knees?

COL SHELTON: Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: And that handle would come off with you?

COL. SHELTON: No, it wouldn't necessarily come off with you.

It could come off. I don't think this makes any difference whether it does or not.

MR. HOUSTON: I wonder how you would avoid it.

COL. SHELITON: You pull it up a pretty good ways and this sets the charge off and this goes up. At the same time this stick here -- the control-is locked in place so it takes care of your knees.

MR. HOUSTON: But how far back can that stick come? Can you give an indication? Is it in a forward position now?

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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: And he does that with two or three movements.
COL. SHELTON: Normally, yes.
handle, or whatever and then he moves to his own personal ejectment.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Colonel, he is supposed to pull this destruct
out when you fly.
in keeping current because these are the things you don't do day in and day
would go through certain of these motions. This is the only way that you have
and at certain times the pilots would go out and with the charges disconnected
COL. SHELTON: As I stated before, at certain of these meetings
take part?
Can you describe those? How did the pilots themselves
COL. SHELTON: Yes, with the charges disconnected.
bil out?
Were there any dry runs on the instructions for
COL. SHELTON: In other words, I will say this was the unit policy.
Were there any dry runs?
discussed.
him aside and instructed him as an individual but in this group this was
over and all are instructed in such. I can't say that I definitely pulled
COL. SHELTON: Well all pilots at certain meetings this is gone
Did you instruct him, Colonel?
COL. SHELTON: Yes, he was.
JUDGE PREFTYMAN: Can you tell me, was Powers instructed?

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COL. SHELTON: It doesn't come too far back, however, if you are flying it manually you can, in order to land, bring it back so the nose goes up and it comes back pretty far. There would be no restriction. It's just like the steering wheel on the automobile. As we get a little older and fatter this wheel might touch our stomach but you would go back so there would be no restriction. The larger the man is the less he would have back here but it would not restrict his use of the control mechanism.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Colonel, if the pilot is going to bail out how many movements does he make in order to eject himself?

COL. SHELTON: Well, normally I would say he would make one,
two - in this particular case the first thing he would do is hit the destruct.

This means that within some minutes or seconds whatever this thing is wired
to would destruct certain portions of this airplane.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That has nothing to do with his ejection.

COL. SHELTON: No, sir.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: If he is going to bail out the first thing he is supposed to do if he wants to destroy the plane --

COL. SHELTON: Not necessarily the plane but some part of it.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Then on the U-2 what were the instructions to the pilot in respect to destroying the plane if they got into difficulty.

COL. SHEITON: To the best of my knowledge all pilots were instructed to use the destruct switch which would then destroy certain classified equipment aboard that aircraft.

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COL. SHELTON: Yes, six.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now one of those movements that you illustrated was to pull some kind of a thing back.

COL. SHELTON: Pull it up.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Does that pull him back in his seat?

GOL SHEITON: As you pull this thing up - it is not designed to put him back in the seat. Normally he would try to get back into the seat as much as possible so that it would not injure him. You pull this up and this would fire. In other aircraft this firing mechanism on the handle is in the form of a trigger.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That firing, is that an actual explosion?

COL. SHELTON: This is a charge that fires the seat out of the airplane. This is normal in all jet aircraft.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That is an explosive charge -- it isn't a catapult mechanism.

COL. SHELTON: No, sir, it is an explosive charge, and as a precaution against this thing going off on the ground we have safety pins.

This is a wire or a pin with a red streamer on it and you put it in certain holes within these mechanisms so that you cannot inadvertently jettison the canopy and seat while you are on the ground, although there have been pilots who did this and they didn't live to tell the tale.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Suppose he pulled the destract switch and put that in motion and then the eject mechanism wouldn't work? There is no way for him to get out.

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COL.	SHELTON:	Yes,	he	can	manually	get	out.
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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: How would you do that?

COL. SHELTON: He would open the canopy and physically crawl

over the side and bail out.

There still would be time before the destruct

mechanism went off?

COL. SHELTON: I would say so, yes.

MR. BROSS: Have you any idea how long it takes for the destruct

mechanism to work?

COL, SHELTON: Being two years off I can't tell you right off.

This has been sent back to headquarters here as to what these planes were set

at. The pilots were made aware of this time.

It is seventy seconds on this airplane. I think anywhere

from fifty to seventy seconds and Mr. Powers testified himself seventy seconds

and this is marked on the destructor itself.

From the time the button is pushed until there is

an explosion - would this necessarily explode the plane?

COL. SHELFON: Not necessarily.

In other words, if the pilot was still in the

cockpit when it exploded would this injure him?

COL. SHELTON: I would say that it would but I wouldn't know for sure. I would say this: if I pushed this and if I couldn't get out automatically I would be getting out manually because the equipment that he was destructing was right behind and below him and I assume any explosion

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that could go off in an aircraft or a car could injure the driver.

Could you give us some idea as to this explosion.

If he did actually press the button would there be a sound or would there be any way of knowing if the mechanism did work?

COL. SHELITON: I can't say for sure but I'd say to the best of my knowledge I feel that if this explosion went off and the pilot was in the cockpit he would know it.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: What do you mean?

COL. SHELITON: He would at least feel it.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: In a minor fashion or would it be serious?

COL. SHELION: This I don't know because as far as I know there has been no test run as to how much damage this would do. I don't know whether it would be enough of an explosion to kill a man or not.

kR. BROSS: I presume you don't know from your own knowledge the amount or types of explosive which are involved in these charges.

COL. SHELITON: As I say it has been two years and I would need to review technical publications in order to find this out.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: The first thing that happened to the pilot was that the plane went into a down speed and threw him up against the front as far forward as his seat belt would let him go up against the instrument panel and the plane was falling. Where would be this destruct switch? Of course, physically it would be in the same place, but I mean in connection with him. If he is sitting normally in his seat I understand the destruct switch is very much handy.

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COL. SHELTON: It is up to the right.

JUDGE PRETYMAN: If the plane was falling and he was thrown all the way forward and the plane continued to fall and he was up against the instrument panel where would the destruct button be? Sould he have to turn back to it?

COL. SHELTON: I would think that he would but I couldn't say.

MR. HOUSTON: It appears from his description he was in an

inverted spin. How would this throw him in the cockpit?

COL. SHELLTON: If you are in an inverted spin it means you have G-forces and you have difficulty in moving. Anytime you have G-forces you have difficulty in moving arms, legs or anywhere else.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That is what I want you to tell me. Assume the man is going into an inverted spin. He was thrown forward. He says he couldn't get himself back in his seat.

COL. SHELTON: If he is in an inverted spin he will have G-forces against him and as a result of this he will have difficulty in moving his arms and legs and so forth.

JUDGE PRINTIYMAN: He would have difficulty in reaching the destruct switch?

COL. SHELTON: He would have difficulty in reaching anything.

He would have difficulty in moving his arms, depending on the amount of

G-forces.

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in a situation of that sort?

COL. SHELTON: If he is in an inverted spin? There again it depends on the G-forces and again on the determination of the individual.

Could he manually take off the canopy

Let me ask this: do you think if he could reach the canopy he could reach the destruct button?

COL. SHEITON: I don't believe that I could answer that.

The only way I could answer that if it was me and I was in an inverted spin my first reaction would be to get out of an inverted spin, depending on the amount of altitude that I had. Now the next thing that I would be thinking of is there is an altitude whereby I had better start getting out of this thing or I won't get out and at that point is when I would start automatically with the ejection. If this didn't work then I would have to do it manually.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I am going to ask you whether what he said happened was a reasonable reaction, and this is when the plane started spinning: "I immediately said 'OK, I've got to get out' - reached up to arm the destructor and then I thought, no, I'd better see if I can use this ejection seat, so I started squirming around trying to force myself back against these G-forces - the G-forces, by the way, were throwing me in - not directly toward the nose of the airplane but forward and toward the canopy rail almost in a line from the seat directly above the instrument panel. And I have no way of knowing how many G's, but there were several - I couldn't force myself with hands and feet back to my seat and I always

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kept my seat belt fairly tight, but it had given enough or it wasn't tight enough so that I was too far forward to use the ejection seat - it was impossible, or I felt that both of my legs would come off - it would hit the canopy."

Is that reasonable?

COL. SHELTON: I would think so.

JUDGE FRETTYMAN: That is a reasonable description of what might very well have been his situation.

COL. SHELTON: Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: Did you ever have an inverted spin?

COL. SHELTON: Yes, sir.

MR. MISKOVSKY: Can you explain generally what an inverted spin

**is**?

COL. SHEIMON: Normally in a spin you go up and over to the left, and in an inverted spin you are over to the right on your back and going around. That is probably the reason he was thrown to the right and a little bit forward because he was on his back and by being on his back this probably put more weight on his safety belt and his shoulder harness. It could be that he did not have his shoulder harness locked at that time, and there would be no reason for him to do it, flying at that altitude he was flying at because he had to get to certain switches and he would be restricted.

MR. HOUSTON: You wouldn't do that in normal flight?

COL. SHELFON: You do this normally when you come in to land

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or where there is an occasion where you have time when you feel you are going to have an accident or crash.

MR. HOUSTON: And particularly not if you are in manual control?

COL. SHELTON: No, at the normal altitude he was flying there would be no reason for him to have his shoulder harness locked because he would want to be in a position that would not restrict him to reach any switches he would want to release.

JUDGE FRETTYMAN: I want to read a little more. "I kept trying to get back in that seat so that I could get prepared to hit the destructor and get out, and this thing was falling and I kept glancing at the altimeter and came on down and the last time I looked at the altimeter it was 34,000 feet -- "

MR. HOUSTON: Where is the altimeter?

the cockpit instrument panel in the photograph . . . .

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: \_\_continues reading \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ -- or somewhere
in that area, and it was unwinding pretty fast and I am sure there was a
big lag and I figured I was a little lower. Then I remembered something that
had told me that - he had had a crash in this airplane, and he
said that he couldn't get his canopy off and he told himself to - talking to
himself, he said 'Bob, you've got to stop and think", and he said - he had

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the canopy on, unloosened them and got out. Well that - I don't know why that came to my mind, but I remembered him saying that, and I told myself the same thing.

'Stop, think', and it suddenly came to me that I could open the canopy and climb out, and that's the - this was the last time I looked at the altimeter at 34,000 feet or lower, right in that area there the altimeter said 34,000, give or take a few hundred. So, I stopped and thought that I could possibly climb out. I reached up and got both the emergency and normal canopy release handles, pulled them back, the normal side released first and it flew open and fell on off very nicely, and I immediately opened my seat belt, and the G-forces raised me up in a sort of a standing position and I got out."

COL. SHELITON: I can't discredit that at all.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That sounds like a reasonable description of what happened to him?

COL. SHELTON: That is a real emergency if you are inverted in a spin coming down. He's probably real lucky that he could see the altimeter and that he was at 34,000 feet. He might have been lower. You are on your back in a spin and you have G-forces. If he panics he's had it. He has no chance at all so he has to have a cool head in order to keep his senses enough to see certain things.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: If a pilot under those circumstances did what he said he did here in that sequence, does that sound like he panicked.

COL. SHELTON: It appears to me he thought about the normal

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handle on the inside of the canopy to open the canopy.

Not always will this canopy come off when you unlock it because sometimes the air pressure itself will held the canopy on.

JUDGE FRETTYMAN: I think the succeeding part of this interrogation answers the question that Mr. Houston raised and makes it clear to me that Powers had opened the canopy and then tried to get back in to press the destructor button and found it impossible to move.

MR. HOUSTON: He still had the G-forces on him.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I think, Mr. Houston, with your permission,

Tape number one, page 39 --

GENERAL BULL: From there on he describes the whole procedure that he went through.

JUDGE PRESTYMAN: Would you read from there on from about the third line on that page to --

GENERAL BULL: About five pages.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: -- including 43 and then tell us whether in your opinion as an experienced commanding officer the procedure that this man followed under these circumstances would be considered reasonable.

MR. HOUSTON: May I add if he sees any discrepancies --GENERAL BULL: If there are any conflicts in the story.

... Colonel Shelton then read to himself pages 39 through
43 from Tape #1, dated 13 February 1962, "Debriefing of Francis Gary

Powers"...

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COL. SHELTON: I might comment here to remember this pilot Mas quite a flying suit on which in itself restricts a pilots movements. Even if you had this suit on sitting in this chair here you would have a little difficulty getting up and down without any G-forces on you. So when you have G-forces this in itself adds to the difficulty, you see. Have you seen a suit of this type with a man in it?

MR. HOUSTON: We had it in the movies.

CQL. SHELTON: The suit was inflated too. Even if you were standing right here or sitting in this chair you would have difficulty.

I just wanted to remark aboutthat.

GENERAL BULL: What is the effect of G-forces on his body while he is in an inverted spin?

COL. SHELTON: This is in addition to the G-forces. We shouldn't lose sight of the fact that this individual had a partial pressure suit on which in itself restricts movement and then with G-forces on him too he is additionally restricted.

GENERAL BULL: The G-forces would have a pull on him.

COL. SHELTON: Quite often if you get enough G's you have real difficulty in raising your hand an inch. For instance, apparently he wasn't blacked out because of the pressure suit but I have blacked out in the early days and in blacking out you black out because of the G-forces and as the G-forces pull the blood leaves your head and as a result you can't see anything but you know what is going on. You have difficulty

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making any movement. Once these G-forces ease off the blood comes back to your head to a degree so you can see and start moving. I wanted to bring this point out before I got any further. Maybe this hadn't been considered. This individual has a suit on which in itself is restrictive. If you could put one of these things on and with a parachute on you would have a problem of just moving right in that seat there.

Is this proper just to comment as I go along? For instance, the normal method of ejection is to have feet flat and close in to your seat and back as far as you can. In other words as you go out you get a certain amount of G-forces. You may get as many as 12, or 15, or 16. This is momentarily.

MR. HOUSTON: From the force of the explosion?

COL. SHELTON: Yes. So from this position the best method is to be back in your seat as much as you can with your legs back and then this is where you would receive the least amount of injury and even with this method there have been pilots that had an injury of the spine as this thing came up -- the seat hits the spine and injures the spine. With this individual inverted and as he says he is out of his seat so I can see there where he would have some concern maybe in using the ejection seat. Even if he could eject it the seat might half way hit him and push him into the instrument panel or sever his head or his legs. I can see from reading this this could be a concern. This indicates to me here's an individual that is thinking and he is thinking under extremely unusual circumstances. He isn't panicked one bit. If he had

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he never would have considered this. For instance, where you are sitting now if you were momentarily ejected up you probably wouldn't have any trouble clearing that desk at all but if you were leaning forward and that seat was suddenly ejected up you could damage your knees or legs or any number of other parts of your body.

Well, he said the same thing I did. He looked at this altimeter to the best of his ability and saw 34,000 feet but figured it was a little lower than that and he is thinking in the right direction. If he was thinking, "Well, it says 34,000, but it's probably 40,000" he is getting into more trouble but he is looking and giving himself a little bit more of a safety factor here. This is good.

Well, this is another good point maybe we should consider. This individual has a face plate on too. He is not looking normally like you and I are. He has a suit on and he has a face plate on and this thing can fog up like your glasses. If your glasses got fogged up right now you would have a very hard time seeing me or anyone else and this face plate that he has on with this helmet and suit could fog up and when this happens you are in real trouble.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  HOUSTON: What might cause it to fog up? Is that after the canopy was off?

COL. SHELTON: You see this thing at that altitude has to be heated in order to keep it from collecting moisture.

MR. HOUSTON: Does he say "after the caopy was off"?

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COL. SHELTON: Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: What page is that on?

COL. SHELTON: Forty-three. See this was when he was trying to get back in the cockpit.

NR. HOUSTON: The sudden lowering of pressure and the cooling off.

COL. SHELTON: Yes. See you would normally have face plate heat.

You need that in a normal altitude because it would fog up because you are

breathing.

MR. HOUSTON: There was heat in the face plate. Were there little wires?

COL. SHELTON: Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: So when he was flying normally at 70,000 feet there was heat to keep it from fogging up. Was the cabin pressurized?

COL. SHELTON: Yes it would have to be pressurized. Now once it was depressurized then the suit took over which inflated and this really restricts you. You have trouble bending your arm. I would suggest if you have never seen one of these -- if you had never seen someone dressed like this and inflated I think it would be an education because he is quite a bit restricted.

MR. HOUSTON: Colonel, with the canopy going off, lack of pressurization would cause the suit to automatically inflate.

COL. SHELTON: This is true. This is for his protection.

What I want to bring out is in addition to everything else he has got he has a face plate that is fogged up and he can't see through. Even if it

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wasn't he couldn't do a lot of seeing, but at least when he is reaching for things, you see, this makes it a little difficult. It's like a blind man the. first time he becomes blind. Of course, there was in the aircraft an emergency face plate heater and, of course, as he brought out too, the possibility that this could have pulled loose when he was to pull out. There is the normal face plate heat and the emergency face plate heat. In other words, in normal flight if the regular face plate heat went out, or there is something wrong with it, you would use this emergency type face plate heat that you could get if you open the canopy. It's very possible that this could have pulled loose at the time as he stated here, although these are supposed to be hooked in but under those circumstances there is a large amount of pressure at force placed on a lot of things over and above what there would be normally.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now I will call your attention to a question after your having read the description of the action he took. In your opinion, as an experienced commanding Air Officer, was what this man did under these circumstances - the circumstances in which he found himself - reasonable?

COL STRITON: Yes, I think so. I think maybe in many cases lots of pilots wouldn't have done as well as this pilot did. A lot of them might have never gotten out of the airplane.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I want to call your attention to one other thing -- this Operations Policy Letter No. 6. As I understand this from the opening it says here that the purpose of this policy letter is to furnish guidance to detachment commanders on the classified information which may

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be furnished to Project pilots concerning their mission, and the briefings which should be given to Project pilots on procedure and conduct to be adhered to in the event they are forced down in hostile terrigory.

Over in paragraph 4, "Conduct and procedures in event of capture. a. If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors." Now do you understand that to be the policy?

COL. SHELTON: Yes, sir.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: "b. At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors." Do you understand that to be the policy?

COL. SHELTON; Yes, sir.

JUDGE PRETIMAN: "c. Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the full truth about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft. They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission. They will be instructed, however, to understate moderately the performance of the aircraft in a plausible fashion. It is recommended that stated capabilities should be decreased from actual capabilities by 10,000 feet altitude and 500 miles range. Such briefing should safeguard pilots from extreme treatment by permitting them the greatest possible latitude in

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responding to interrogations." Do you understand that to be part of
the policy and these things I read to you were part of your instructions to
your men? Is that correct?

COL. SHELTON: This is correct.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I find nothing in here referring to the poison needle or its use. Was there anything in any ohter policy letter or in any briefing that you gave the men that in the event of a capture they should kill themselves?

COL. SMELTON: That they should kill themselves?

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Yes.

COL. SHELTON: To the best of my knowledge the pilot was never briefed as such; however this device was --

MR. HOUSTON: Do you mean briefed on the needle?

MR. BROSS: Briefed to kill himself.

COL. SIEITON: No he was never briefed to kill himself. This was to be used at his own discretion depending on his own circumstances.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I get the impression the purpose of this policy letter seems to be against self destruction by the pilot. I'd like to get your view on this. It says the pilot should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude which sounds the policy of the letter was against self destruction by the pilot.

COL. SHELFON: If his treatment by his captors was such that they were, say unbearable then he had a devise that he could do something

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about it. This is my understanding of it. For instance, if I was your captor and I twisted your arm to the point that you felt that rather than go on ahead and suffer that you would rather inflict death upon yourself, then this was your prerogative. It was your understanding that this was the purpose of the needle. Was it any part of your understanding that a pilot not subjected to torture was under an obligation to kill himself merely because he had been shot down in enemy territory?

COL. SHELTON: No, sir, this was not implied or discussed or even thought of to the best of my knowledge by either me or any of the people or pilots or any of the people that worked for me.

CENERAL BULL: Was the carrying of the needle optional or mandatory?

COL. SHELTON: It was optional. There were pilots who would not carry any of those devices.

MR. HOUSTON: Had he carried it on previous missions, if youknow?

COL. SHELTON: To the best of my knowledge while I was there he was not on a mission. The missions that he flew were not as sensitive as this one and as far as I know he did not carry it.

The needle was relatively new at that time.

COL. SHELTON: True. There were other devices we felt were outmoded and in themselves could be dangerous and in research of this we felt that the mission itself may be in jeopardy and as a result we asked for a more modern type of device that could be used and this was optional to the pilot.

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GENERAL BULL: I have just one other short question. I'd like to ask, reading from that same document, he speaks of the first thing he saw was a distinctly orange color surrounging him and the clap in back. He saw the light through the canopy but it was apparently the sound which was in the rear of his cockpit. Does that color indicate anything at all as to the cause of the failure of the mission or anything about it chemically or otherwise that would indicate a direct hit or an explosive.

MR. HOUSTON: General, might I say that this is a matter of very great concern which has seen gone into from several aspects by other technical groups and I would like to suggest that I don't think this is the right place.

GENERAL BULL: I thought it might mean something to him. I suggest we delete that question.

MR. BROSS: I would like to revert to a previous question that you asked the Colonel with respect to standing policy concerning the destruction of the plane. What was your understanding of the instructions under which pilots were operating with respect to their duty, if you like, their obligation to destroy the plane before taking measures to escape.

COL. SHELITON: Do you mean whether or not they use it, or the sequence?

MR. BROSS: Let me revert to the actual record of what happened.

He made very considerable effort to push the destructor. This obligation to

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destroy the plane was very much present in his mind in spite of the emergency. After he had opened the canopy he still made vigorous efforts to reach the destructor and concluded that it was impossible. His precise words were that he realized it was impossible for him to get back into the cockpit and reach the destructor. In your judgment do you feel that this was a reasonable conclusion under the circumstances?

COL. SHELTON: Yes I do.

MR. BROSS: And do you - would you feel that there is any policy which required him to do more than he actually did, assuming his statement is true, at the time his plane was going down?

COL. SHELTON: As I say this policy in the squadron was to hit the destruct switch whenever possible. In other words, knowing that we had classified equipment on board, whenever it was humanly possible that switch should be used. I think this probably was in his mind all the time. As you can see, there were a million and one things that would run through his mind in a matter of fractions of seconds and apparently this one thing continued to run through and he never lost conscious of the fact that he had not used this switch and I say again this stems from training. We all hate to train, but we know that through training when you get into an emergency situation these are the things that pop into your mind first and I feel that this is the reason he continued to try to hit the switch.

MR. BROSS: You feel he did all he could under the circumstances.

I don't want to press you on this but your judgment has been asked with respect

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to these other matters and I would like to get your reaction to this.

COL. SHELTON: Yes, sir. It is hard to say. He never got to use the switch. The complete situation you don't know, but here's a man with this suit on and it is inflated. Even if he were sitting here in a normal condition he would have a problem in moving. Here he is in an inverted spin with G-forces on him. He is half out and half in the cockpit. He really doesn't know what altitude he is at. He is on the verge of dying and yet through all this he still has this one thing on his mind.

We have to assume that what he is saying here is the truth.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: For the purpose of these answers, we assume it is.

COL. SHELTON: I wonder how many men would really do this?

There are some men that would probably destruct without getting out at all.

There are two sides to it.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: You made reference to having classified material aboard. I assume you mean the camera was classified equipment and the film was, I suppose, classified equipment. This destruct mechanism -- what would that do?

COL. SHELITON: It would destroy the camera.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: What do you mean "destroy"? Would it burn the film?

COL SHELTON: It was an explosive charge that theoretically would damage the camera mechanism to the point that it would be impossible to identify.

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COL. SHELTON: It is approximately two and a half pounds of high explosive located in the U-2 equipment by upper aft, left side and in the U-2C in the wheel well in a pressure box aft of the equipment bay, primarily designed to effect the equipment.

. . . The meeting then adjourned at 1705 hours . . . .

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